2. General President McCarron and His Political Allies and Paid Agents Serving on the Trial Committee Were Biased Against Me Because of Conflicts of Interest Arising From McCarron's Business and Professional Ties to Perini Construction and Tutor-Saliba, Public Works Contractor on the SFO Job Allegedly Disrupted by Wildcat Strike Activity

The general contractor on the San Francisco Airport job that was the site of the May 20 rank-and-file member demonstration I am charged with leading is Tutor-Saliba. Ronald Tutor, President of Tutor-Saliba, is a close business associate of General President McCarron. Tutor arranged for McCarron's appointment to the Board of Directors of Perini Construction, a subsidiary of Tutor-Saliba for which Ronald Tutor serves as the Chief Operating Officer. Tutor and McCarron served as Co-Chairmen of the $1.3 billion Carpenters Pension Trust Fund of Southern California and have been business partners in various ventures. As a Director of Perini, McCarron received an annual retainer of $16,000 and reimbursement of expenses. He also received lucrative stock options to purchase Perini common stock which do not expire until January 2005.

McCarron's business association and dealings with the principal owner and Chief Executive Officer of Tutor-Saliba and McCarron's interest as a stockholder and Director of Tutor-Saliba subsidiary Perini Construction create a serious and substantial conflict of interest with respect to any involvement by McCarron in the charges against me for leading rank-and-file members on a wildcat strike that purportedly damaged Tutor-Saliba. Because of this blatant conflict of interest, the establishment of a Trial Committee made up entirely of Regional Council executives appointed by McCarron who are indebted to McCarron for their jobs and are political allies of McCarron in the burgeoning dispute over the future of our union was inherently unfair and calculated to deprive me of basic due process rights.

The Trial Committee Improperly Prejudged the Penalty By Not Allowing Any Penalty Other Than Expulsion from Membership Upon a Finding of Guilty

The UBC Constitution establishes minimum due process procedures which limit the authority of a Trial Committee to making findings of guilt or innocence on charges and recommendations of penalties. (Section 52(L)) A penalty cannot be imposed on a finding of guilt unless it is approved by a majority of the members present at the meeting in which the report of the Trial Committee is presented. (Section 52(L)) In addition, the Constitution provides that a penalty properly imposed by a Trial Committee with membership approval may nevertheless be set aside or reduced by a majority vote of the members before an appeal is filed. (Section 52(M)) These due process protections are restated and emphasized in the UBC Policy and Procedure Manual on charges, trials and appeals. (See Exh. 5) The trial procedures adopted by the Trial Committee in my case deprive me of these due process protections regarding the impositions of penalties that are mandatory under the UBC Constitution. The Trial Committee did not make a "recommendation" of penalty, did not present a proposed penalty to members for approval, and did
not afford me an opportunity to have the penalty set aside by membership vote as required by Sections 52L and M. Instead, the Trial Committee pre-judged the penalty of expulsion without regard for any consideration of mitigating factors or circumstances. The Trial Committee assumed that expulsion was the automatic penalty upon a finding of strike activity in breach of the No-Strike Clause of the SFO Project Labor Agreement without regard to any other circumstance. (Decision, p. 2) This deprivation of my due process rights guaranteed by the UBC Constitution and prejudgment of penalty without regard for an extenuating or mitigating circumstances was a violation of the Constitution and requires that the penalty of expulsion be set aside.

C. The Trial Committee Ignored Evidence From Defense Witnesses and Improperly Relied on the Testimony of Biased Witnesses and Political Opponents Who Were Employees of the NCCRC Regional Executive John Casey When the Actions Which In Fact Motivated the Charges and Expulsion Were the Opposition of Reimann and the "Working Carpenters for a Stronger Union"

The Trial Committee relied heavily on the witnesses presented by Charging Party Draper and largely disregarded the evidence I presented (Decision, p. 3). Draper's witnesses that provided the basis for the Trial Committee's conclusion that I "actively led and encouraged the wildcat strike at the San Francisco Airport" were Rigoberto Laguardia, Duke White, and William Gary Martin. These were very biased witnesses and political opponents of myself and the Working Carpenters for a Stronger Union in the hostile dispute and fundamental controversy over the Regional Council's corrupt ratification process. Each of these witnesses were "at will" employees of the NCCRC Chief Executive John Casey, a key figure in the scheme to deprive rank-and-file members of historical ratification rights and impose substandard terms and conditions on members through the amendment and extension of the Northern California Master Agreement. William Martin is President of the NCCRC and part of the Executive Management imposed by the Working Carpenters for a Stronger Union. LaGuardia and White are business agents employed by the Regional Council. The job security of all three of Draper's witnesses relied on by the Trial Committee to convict me depends on their continuing demonstration of loyalty to NCCRC Chief Executive John Casey.

The Trial Committee's disregard of my evidence and witnesses and refusal to account for the obvious bias of all of Draper's witnesses demonstrates the Trial Committee's bias against me as well as its prejudgment of my guilt in furtherance of the plan of retaliation for organizing and leading rank-and-file member dissent to the Regional Council's rough ratification process and substandard tentative agreements.

D. The Trial Committee Improperly Relied on a Collusive "Arbitration Decision" Resulting from Secret Star Chamber Proceedings Without Notice to Reimann, Local 713, Or Any Other Member Involved in the Alleged Wildcat Strike

The Trial Committee concluded that the "wildcat strike" was a violation of the Labor Agreement in the opinion of an independent labor arbitrator based on a letter "opinion" from Gerald McKay (Decision, p. 2; Trial Exh. E). McKay was not an independent labor arbitrator, but the permanent arbitrator for the Northern California Master Agreement whose continuing service and substantial income depended on allegiance to the principal contracting parties, the Regional Council and the Contractors Association. McKay's "opinion" was written on the night of May 20, 1999 without any arbitration, hearing, or proceeding which contested issues regarding the determination of wildcat strike activity in breach of the agreement were raised or resolved. The singular interest of Regional Council and the Contractors Association was to protect the defectively ratified Master Agreement against further rank-and-file opposition, organizing and job site demonstrations by procuring a secret arbitration award designed to coerce and threaten members in the exercise of the rights of free speech and assembly. There was no notice of any arbitration hearing or proceeding and no opportunity was given to Local 713 or any members participating in the alleged wildcat activity to be present or present evidence. It was grossly unfair for the Trial Committee to rely on McKay's opinion letter to convict me. I had no notice or opportunity to participate in the purported arbitration.

The Trial Committee Demonstrated a Clear Bias Against the Accused and Acted as the Prosecutor on Behalf of the Charging Party

The Trial Committee demonstrated clear bias against me by allowing Draper a totally free hand to introduce any "evidence" he wished, while strictly limiting me to the narrowest possible interpretation to the charges. In addition, the Trial Committee itself assumed the role of a prosecutor on Draper's behalf asking improper questions and exhibiting pre-judged conclusions. (See Transcript, pp. 173-175) Even though the Trial Committee admitted engaging in such improper questioning (Transcript, p. 175), they still based their findings against me on the product of that questioning.

The Trial Committee improperly restricted my questioning while allowing Draper the widest possible latitude. At one point the Committee agreed to allow me certain questions for a particular witness and then breached its agreement and refused to allow my questioning when the witness was testifying (See Transcript, pp. 106 and 184)

The actions of the Trial Committee in conducting the trial demonstrated clear bias that would be expected from a biased tribunal handpicked by political opponents to implement a plan of retaliation for legitimate union activism, dissent and free speech and assembly activities. Even without the self-interested affiliations and loyalties which biased this Trial Committee, the Committee's conduct itself was so prejudicial that I was unable to obtain a fair trial.

III. THE CHARGES AND TRIAL COMMITTEE DECISION AND PENALTY WERE IN RETALIATION FOR FREE SPEECH AND OTHER CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED ACTIVITIES IN OPPOSITION TO THE ANTI-DEMOCRATIC AND UNLAWFUL ACTIONS OF THE REGIONAL COUNCIL IN FORCING A SUBSTANDARD MASTER CONTRACT ON THE MEMBERS WITHOUT PROPER NOTICE, OPPORTUNITY FOR MEANINGFUL DEBATE, OR PROPER RATIFICATION

A. The Working Carpenters for a Stronger Union Is a Proper Committee of Rank & File Members Formed to Advocate for a Stronger Union and Better Contract Terms and Conditions ; The Trial Committee's Witch Hunt, McCarthy-style Tactics to Force "Naming Names" and Description of the Inner Workings of WCSU Demonstrates Improper Bias and Denial of Due Process Rights

The Trial Committee's real target was obviously the rank and file Working Carpenters for a Stronger Union (WCSU). The Trial Committee found without any evidence that the "agenda" of the WCSU was a "wildcat strike." (Decision, p. 4) At the same time, the Trial Committee admitted that "the role of this group in the planning and organization of this wildcat strike is difficult to ascertain." (Decision, p. 4) The Trial Committee improperly considered my refusal to "name names" of members of the WCSU as evidence of both its "agenda" of a wildcat strike and my role in leading a wildcat strike. (Decision, p. 4)

The Trial Committee was not acting as an impartial tribunal as required by the UBC Constitution and federal law. Instead, they engaged in a witch hunt, employing McCarthy-style intimidation tactics seeking to force me to "name names" of active union members whose agenda was to build a stronger union and win improved contracts. The Trial Committee was acting as a prosecutor on behalf of the Charging Party, Mr. Draper. I was genuinely concerned that naming names of good union members involved in absolutely legal free speech activities and dissent against the Regional Council leaders would lead to retaliation and blackballing which has historically occurred in response to such dissent. I was denied due process in my trial because my proper refusal to explain the workings of the Working Carpenters for a Stronger Union or name names was used against me by the Trial Committee. The burden was on Charging Party Draper to prove his allegations. The Trial Committee improperly relieved Draper of this burden by trying to force me to "name names" and then finding against me because of my exercise of rights to refuse these demands.

B. The Real Agenda of the Trial Committee Was to Carry Out a Plan of Retaliation for Successful Rank & File and Local Union Opposition to the Regional Council's Corrupt Ratification Process

On May 15, an improper "ratification" vote on proposed amendment and extension of the Northern California Master Agreement was held by John Casey, EST of the Northern California Carpenters Regional Council (NCCRC) and Gary Martin, president of the NCCRC. This vote was by council delegates only, per orders of General President Doug McCarron. This "ratification" process was improper, unfair and deceptive and violated several provisions of the UBC constitution, including the following:

The right of contract ratification recognized in Section 46(J) of the UBC Constitution has been denied members of NCCRC affiliated Local Unions as a result of ad hoc ratification procedures that were hastily and improperly adopted and implemented by NCCRC executive management in order to obtain a contract they wanted and foreclose the proper exercise of elected Council delegate authority and responsibility as well as meaningful member participation in the ratification process.

Section 42(J) grants authority to the Council to establish the method of contract ratification. The Council consists of delegates duly elected by and accountable to their respective Local Union memberships. The Council delegates possess the exclusive authority to adopt operating procedures to govern the NCCRC and Local Unions, and to enact all measures, resolutions, trade rules, instructions to members and Local Unions and all other actions that may be necessary to further the objectives and purposes of the Council. (NCCRC Bylaws, Section 32(A).)

The current NCCRC Bylaws were imposed by the General President at the time of regional restructuring and establishment of the NCCRC. The bylaws generally establish the authority of the Council to negotiate and ratify contracts. (NCCRC Bylaws Section 18.) However, the "Council" as defined in Section 46(J) of the UBC Constitution is not the Executive Officer, executive management, or executive committee, it is the duly elected Local Union delegates sitting as a whole. The Council delegates have never determined the "method of ratification" for tentative agreements negotiated by representatives of the NCCRC in accordance with Section 46(J). The NCCRC management and executive officers did not submit proposed ratification procedures for consideration and final determination by the Council delegates as required by Section 46(J) of the UBC Constitution and Section 32(A) of the NCCRC Bylaws. Instead, they took it upon themselves to adopt their own ad hoc procedures in order to accomplish a quick "ratification" to avoid meaningful consideration, debate and dissent. The NCCRC management and executive officers did not and do not have this authority.

The ad hoc method of ratification secretly adopted by NCCRC management violated the Council's own Bylaws, standing rules and established practice. For example:

The ratification vote meeting of May 15 was by nature a "Special Convention" of the Council within the meaning of Section 32(D) of the NCCRC Bylaws, which requires at least thirty days advance written notice to delegates. The notice in this case was dated May 5, but was not received by many delegates until five or less days before May 15 and not at all by some. (The Notice describes the meeting as a "Special Called Meeting." It must be interpreted as a notice of Special Convention because the NCCRC Bylaws do not recognize or authorize a "special called meeting" or the Council except upon the written request of a majority of the affiliated Local Unions.)

The rules of eligibility for voting on the contract proposal at the May 15 meeting were changed and manipulated at will by NCCRC executive management in order to disqualify perceived opponents to ratification and permit voting by known supporters, including NCCRC employees who were directed by John Casey to vote for ratification. For example, the duly elected delegates of Local 34 were denied the right to vote while the appointed delegates of Local 25 were permitted to vote. NCCRC President Martin initially announced the longstanding rule and practice that only elected delegates would be permitted to vote. NCCRC staff who were not elected delegates were permitted to vote.

There was no uniform or secure credentialing process; not-delegate employees of the NCCRC and other non-delegates were permitted to attend and vote. The utter chaos of the meeting aided the effort of NCCRC executive management to push through a defective ratification vote. Robert's Rules of Order were not followed, proper motions and points regarding ratification procedures and voting eligibility were summarily and improperly ruled out of order.

NCCRC staff participating in the ratification vote did so with a serious conflict of interest because of the extraordinary salary increase at stake for them which was not available to the vast majority of working carpenters. NCCRC staff make up approximately 1/3 of the total NCCRC delegates. Their special pecuniary interest in a favorable ratification vote diluted the democratic voice of duly elected, rank and file delegates and disgraced the representative democratic process the NCCRC is supposed to provide.

Members were denied the guarantee of representative democracy and meaningful participation in the ratification process. The "survey" of members cited by NCCRC executive management was calculated to mislead the few members who actually received the mailing; it was promoted as a survey of member "feelings" and asked for a yes or no vote on the singular question of whether the recipient wanted an extension of the current 1996-2000 Master Agreement. There was no ballot proposition to vote on amendments to the current agreement, nor explanation of the effect of the proposed amendments. Although a purported summary was enclosed, it was misrepresented as a contract extension and omitted important information and elements of the actual deal negotiated by NCCRC executive management. There was no disinterested party involved in tabulating the "results" of this survey. Neither this deceptive survey of member "feelings" nor the notice to delegates of the May 15 Special Called Council Meeting afforded sufficient time or meaningful opportunity for membership debate and consideration at Local Union meetings prior to May 15.

Feeling totally locked out of the process, members took matters into their own hands and walked off jobs starting on May 20. It is interesting to note that according to the testimony of Rigoberto LaGuardia, witness for the accuser, carpenters at the S.F. airport job were talking about walking off as early as May 13, more than a week before I was out there or even knew of anybody who worked there. This fact was totally ignored by the Trial Committee.

A rank and file group, "Working Carpenters for a Stronger Union" was formed to help coordinate the campaign against the illegal contract vote as well as against the contract itself. I was elected chair of this group and carried out various actions after members present at our open meetings had a full opportunity to discuss and vote on the actions to be taken.
Also, as a result of rank-and-file member organizing against the contract, attendance at the meetings of many locals increased some ten-fold. For once the members felt that they had a chance to influence the direction their union was taking. At three locals, including Local 713, the members voted overwhelmingly to put up $5,000 from the Local in order to challenge the validity of the May 15 vote in court.

What was the response of the NCCRC and International leadership?
EST John Casey was silent. Mike Draper, 7th and 8th District Board Member, responded by threatening to bring up on charges any local officer who signed the check for the attorney that the locals had hired. (See Exhibit 1.) In other words, he was seeking to pressure the local officers into refusing to carry out the duties that their membership had mandated them to do. Fortunately, in none of the locals did the local officers back down to this attempt at intimidation.

A series of letters between the attorney hired by the three locals and the attorney for the NCCRC followed. In the course of these letters it became clear that the NCCRC's legal stand was very weak indeed, and as a result General President Doug McCarron intervened by ordering a new vote on the contract, thus saving the NCCRC leadership the humiliation of losing in court. (See Exhibits 2, 3, 4) We should emphasize that this order by McCarron only came after the wildcat strike and the threat of legal action by attorneys for three local unions.

The fact that these locals, as locals, took official action to challenge the corrupt ratification process and substandard contract outraged the executive management of the NCCRC and Mike Draper. This demonstration of democratic trade unions in the rank-and-file activism is the real target of Draper's changes and the Trial Committee's ruling against me.

C. Draper's Express Threats to Bring Charges Against Local Officials Who Authorize Legal Action to Challenge Corrupt Regional Council Ratification Procedures Exposes The Real Motivation for the Charges and Trial Committee's Decision

The wild cat strike at the San Francisco Airport I am charged with "leading" occurred on May 20, 1999. The efforts of members to organize Local Union opposition to the deceptive and improper ratification process used by the Regional Council leadership to force acceptance of amendments and extension of the Northern California master agreement took place over a few weeks in late May and early June resulting in duly adopted motions and resolutions by the members of three separate UBC Locals to take legal action: Carpenters Local 22, Pile Drivers Local 34, and Carpenters Local 713. Leaders of other Locals whose members were also adversely affected by the corrupt ratification process for changes in the master agreement were also taking steps to obtain formal membership approval for their participation in anticipated legal action. Michael Draper tried to stop this activism and potential legal challenge by threatening Local Union leaders with internal union charges and lawsuits for authorizing and participating in such efforts.

Draper characterized any such legal challenge to the ratification process as "action designed to obstruct the administration of collective bargaining agreements that have been lawfully ratified." (Exh. 1, p. 1) He threatened to bring charges under Section 14D of the UBC Constitution against any person authorizing expenditure of Local Union funds for legal fees on such challenges. (Exh. 1, p. 1) By the time I received Draper's letter dated June 11, 1999, Local 713 had already approved taking this legal action by an overwhelming membership vote at a meeting attended by more than 200 members. Other Locals were also taking such actions at the same time.

Draper's June 11 letter also threatened to bring charges against members participating in wild cat strike activity. He made several arguments against such activity and then stated that "I will take action against any individuals who engage in unlawful strikes in the future." (Exh. 1, p. 2) This warning and threat of adverse action for activity that Draper stated the UBC "cannot tolerate" was made nearly one month after the SFO "wildcat strike" activity I was charged with by Draper in late August, 1999 !
Draper's warning and solely concerned actions against "any individuals who engage in unlawful strikes in the future." More than two months later he recanted and filed charges against me for past strike activity occurring before his June 11, 1999 warning and demand. Draper was well aware of all of the conduct with which I am charged in this case before he authored and distributed his June 11, 1999 letter. His failure to bring these charges then and to delay action until after the ratification dispute was resolved by McCarron's concession to demands for a new ratification vote reflects the true motivation for Draper's charges -- interference with rank and file member rights of free speech and assembly.
If the Trial Committee can assume that I am guilty of Draper's charges because I refuse to name names of Union members involved in legitimate dissident activity, or otherwise explain how the membership organized, the Committee must also assume that Draper's failure and refusal to file "charges" against me at or near the time of my alleged misconduct demonstrates a determination by Draper of my innocence of the charges in this case. In fact, it can only be assumed from Draper's own comments and timing of correspondence and charges that the charges in this case were intended as retaliation for our successful efforts to raise funds for legal actions challenging the corrupt and faulty ratification procedure.

IV. THE LIFETIME EXPULSION OF REIMANN FROM UNION MEMBERSHIP UNLAWFULLY INTERFERES WITH HIS FUTURE WORK OPPORTUNITIES BECAUSE OF PREFERENTIAL HIRING HALL RULES AND PRACTICES FAVORING UBC MEMBERS

The amended and extended master agreement for Northern California provides a special hiring preference solely for members of the dispatching Local Union. (See Exhibit 8, #8 Hiring :"an additional 25% of the employees employed to perform work covered by this Agreement on any job or project may be selected by the individual employer from workers who are registered on the out-of-work list and who are members of the Local Union having jurisdiction over the job or project.") The Trial Committee's penalty of lifetime expulsion from membership in the Union deprives me of this special hiring preference and interferes with my future work opportunities.

THE GOOD OF THE UNION REQUIRES RANK & FILE ACTIVISM, DISSENT, AND MEANINGFUL DEBATE ; THIS EXPULSION IS CONTRARY TO THE GOOD OF THE UNION AND SHOULD BE OVERTURNED

The charges against me and the decision upholding those charges were made without due process by a biased tribunal carrying out the directives of UBC superiors and political allies to impose severe punishment on me in retaliation for entirely legitimate and protected free speech activity and internal membership organizing. This biased proceeding and the unfair decision it produced was intended to intimidate and coerce rank and file members and to provide a standing threat of actions against members who speak out and take action against the corporatization of their union and loss of fundamental democratic rights. The Decision to expel me from membership will create more controversy and conflict within the Union. (See Exhibits 9 &13) The good of the Union requires that this serious injustice and attack on democratic unionism be corrected by overturning the biased decision of the Trial Committee and dismissing Draper's politically motivated and improper charges.


THE CHARGES MUST BE DISMISSED

For reasons stated above, the Trial Committee's Decision should be overturned and the charges dismissed. The charges were intended to intervene with free speech and membership rights of rank-and-file union members. A biased Trial Committee carried out the unlawful plan of retaliation against me in order to intimidate and coerce members and quell rank-and-file dissent and democratic activism. The unfair trial proceeding and rigged decision against me is an attack on the fundamental principles of democratic unions and harmful to the interests of UBC members.

DATE: January 5, 2000
JOHN REIMANN